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Abstract 
 
 
  This paper presents a somewhat novel theory of innovation in the economy 
wide setting. The starting point for this theory is the creative destruction process at the 
firm and industry level. However, an extension to an economy wide setting requires the 
explicit theorization of the role of the state as well as an interacting nonlinear market 
process. The direction in which the theory leads is a complex interaction between state 
policies and market processes that influence the decisions taken by specific firms in 
particular areas of innovative activities.  The key concept that is developed in this context 
can be called a  Managed Creative Destruction(MCD) process. In a national (or regional) 
MCD, the creative destruction process characterizing innovation is structured more 
consciously by the state (or the states in a particular region). It can be argued that China is 
now going through this process. In this paper the particular case studied is South Korea's 
recent historical experience. Following Schumpeter we assume that innovation in specific 
firms can have economy-wide effects. Models based on this idea can be shown to have 
multiple equilibria. The idea of a positive feedback loop innovation system or POLIS is 
formalized by picking an appropriate sequence of equilibria over time. It is shown that 
POLIS has empirical relevance by applying the formal model to an actual economy. 
Recent financial crisis in many Asian countries, most notably South Korea, seems to have 
reversed the conventional wisdom regarding the East Asian “miracle”. This paper applies 
the concept of a POLIS to show that neither the current view that the miracle was a 
mirage nor the earlier contrarian view that the growth was a result of factor accumulation 
only is correct. Ultimately technological transformation — in particular the creation of a 
positive feedback loop innovation system is what makes the difference between sustained 
growth and gradual or sudden decline. Although various problems remain in both the real 
and the financial sectors, it will be premature to dismiss the impressive achievements and 
the future possibilities of the South Korean economy. 
 
Keywords:   technological transformation, multiple equilibria,  
   POLIS (positive feedback loop innovation system), Korea,South 
Korean POLIS, Managed Creative Destruction(MCD) 
 
JEL Categories:  O33, D50, D57, O38 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
   
  This paper presents a somewhat novel theory of innovation in the economy 
wide setting. The starting point for this theory is the creative destruction process at the 
firm and industry level. However, an extension to an economy wide setting requires the 
explicit theorization of the role of the state as well as an interacting nonlinear market 
process. The direction in which the theory leads is a complex interaction between state 
policies and market processes that influence the decisions taken by specific firms in 
particular areas of innovative activities. The key concept that is developed in this context 
can be called a  Managed Creative Destruction(MCD). In a national (or regional) MCD, 
the creative destruction process characterizing innovation is structured more consciously 
by the state (or the states in a particular region). It can be argued that China is now going 
through this process. In this paper the particular case studied is South Korea.1 Using 
recent economic history the process of MCD in this particular case is studied in detail so 
that the somewhat abstract features of the theory and the mathematical modeling of the 
theory can be seen in a concrete context. 
 
     In Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy Schumpeter characterized creative destruction in 
the following way: 
 
The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in 
motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of 
production or transportation, the new markets,....  (This process) 
incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly 
destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of 
Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.2 
 
  
  The essence of capitalism in this view, is the constant revolutionizing of 
the economic structure from within. Marx had made a similar observation about the 
endogenous nature of technical change (Marx, 1867, 1945). Recently Aghion and Howitt 
(1992) have proposed a model of creative destruction by treating  the innovation process 
as in the patent-race literature. 
  
  The present paper assumes following Schumpeter and Aghion and Howitt 
that innovation in specific firms can have economy-wide effects. The expected  growth 
rate of the economy depends on the economy-wide amount of research; but the process of 
this growth, precisely because research leads to the development of new products and 
processes, is characterized by creative destruction.  
                                                          
1
 The complexities of this MCD process at the country level can not be overemphasized. Even after 
emabarking on the process crises could set it back as  Khan(2004) shows. For an excellent discussion of 
some further problems in post-crisis Korea see Lee et.als.(2005) 
2
  Schumpeter (1942) p. 83 
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  The relationship between R&D and growth is therefore both intimate and 
complex. An economy-wide model intending to capture this complex relationship will 
need to posit non-linearities and complex feedback rules. In this paper, an attempt is 
made by  endowing production functions and correspondences with some of these 
features. In particular, by defining non-linear production structures so that increasing 
returns and  endogenous innovations are possible one can explore the properties of fixed 
points that define equilibria at any point in time. A sequence of such equilibria over time, 
picked  by an appropriate selection procedure, can then show the evolution of the system.  
 
  Section 2 presents the idea of technological complexity which leads to 
MCD and two relevant models motivated by this discussion. The existence and 
characterization of multiple equilibria show the possibility of creating a positive feedback 
loop innovation system (POLIS) in a model economy on an abstract function space. 
Section 3 is an initial attempt to apply the abstract theorems to a real world economy 
through a series of linear approximations. The economy chosen for this purpose is that of 
South Korea. Recent controversy between contending perspectives on technological 
change makes Korea an interesting case. Potentially, a modeling approach embodying 
POLIS offers an alternative to the standard growth accounting approach  to assessing the 
presence and impact of technical change. The results presented here are preliminary but 
promising enough to establish the empirical relevance of the alternative models of growth 
through creative destruction. 
   
2.  Technological Complexity and Models of POLIS 
 
2.A. Technological Systems as Complex Structures 
 
  As the debate on the “East Asian miracle” underlines, the key strategic 
question for a country that has made a technological transition from a traditional to a 
modern system concerns the prospects for long-term economic growth.  Ultimately, it is 
the sustainable long-term rate of growth that will determine the wealth that can be 
distributed among personal consumption, investment, government spending on 
infrastructure and public services, etc. 
 
  Therefore, it is the creation of an innovation system that will determine the 
viability of a technology-based growth process.  This process of building an innovation 
system is very much an evolutionary and path-dependent process.(Nelson 1981, 1989, 
1993, 1994; Nelson and Winter 1974, 1977, 1982) The central idea is that the provision 
of appropriate types of capital, labor and forms of organization for high value-added 
industries will lead to rapid productivity increases.  However, to sustain such an increase, 
a domestic innovation system must be set up. There is a further requirement that this 
innovation system must fulfill. This is the requirement of a positive feedback loop or a 
virtuous cycle of innovations. 
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  This problem, as we will see soon, is intimately connected with the 
existence of multiple equilibria in complex economies.  A positive feedback loop leading to 
a virtuous cycle of growth and technology development is one particular sequence of 
equilibria in this context. In general, such a sequence also involves increasing returns. In the 
remainder of this section a theoretical exploration of innovation with increasing returns and 
multiple equilibria will be undertaken. 
 
  In a market economy, ‘success’ is often cumulative or self-reinforcing.  
Typically outcomes are not predictable in advance.  However, once an equilibrium gets 
selected out of a number of long-run equilibria, there is a tendency to be locked in.  
Technically, economic processes exhibit non-convexities -- violating the generic 
assumption of competitive equilibrium economics. The presence of self-reinforcing 
mechanisms sharing common features found in fields as far apart as enzyme reactions and 
the economics of technical change underlines the importance of such mechanisms in 
governing the dynamics of self-reinforcing processes regardless of the field in which they 
occur. 
 
2.B.  A ‘Simple’ Non-linear Model of Complexity3 
  
  In order to give the reader some idea of the problem of formalizing 
complex technological systems I summarize here the basic structure of a ‘simple’ non-
linear model embodying distinct technological systems. At any single point in time, the 
model can be presented as a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) representation of the 
socio-economic system.  The key distinction here is the explicitly non-linear nature of the 
economy-wide functional relationships. The key theorem shows the existence of multiple 
equilibria. Some further considerations of complexity and increasing returns show that 
multiple equilibria are indeed the natural outcomes in such models. Thus, there would 
seem to be some role for domestic policy in guiding the economy to a particular 
equilibrium among many. 
 
  The virtue of an economy-wide approach to technology systems is the 
embodiment of various inter-sectoral linkages.  In a SAM, such linkages are mappings 
from one set of accounts to another. In terms of technology systems, the production 
activities can be broken down into a production (sub-) system and a set of innovative 
activities. In practice, this presents considerable difficulties of classification and empirical 
estimation. 
 
  One major component of the entire innovation system is, of course, the 
expenditures on R&D.  In the SAM for Korea used here, this can appear either as an 
aggregate expenditure along the column labeled R&D, or as a set of disaggregated 
                                                          
3
  Khan (1997c ,1998,2002 and 2004) contain technical discussion and proofs of Existence 
of multiple equilibria for an entire class of models of this type. 
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expenditures.4  In the latter case these may be specified according to productive activities 
(e.g., construction, electrical equipment, etc.) or by institutions (e.g., private R&D 
expenditures, government R&D expenditures, etc.).  It should be emphasized that the 
dynamic effects of R&D on the economy can be captured only in a series of such SAMs 
over time.  This approach is still at the conceptual stage, but appears to be quite 
appealing.  One can contrast the possible policy experiments that can be undertaken 
within such a framework with the apparently ad hoc science and technology policies in 
many developing countries. In particular, the impact over time of a POLIS can be traced 
by building and maintaining such SAMs. 
 
  Choice of new technology in a developing country is affected by research 
and development in at least three different ways. Such a country can attempt to develop 
new technology through R&D, as mentioned previously.  This ultimately requires a 
positive feedback loop innovation system in order to be self-sustaining.  Another 
alternative is to adapt existing technology. This too requires a production system geared 
towards innovation in a limited way. A third alternative is to import technology or to 
acquire it through attracting foreign direct investment. In practice, all these different 
forms may be combined. The abstract model embodies all these different possibilities. 
However, the first option requires, among other things, a presence of multiple equilibria.5 
In a unique equilibrium world the competitive equilibrium (under the assumption of 
complete markets) will always be the most efficient one. The presence of increasing 
returns usually destroys such competitive conditions.  
 
  We begin with a number of productive activities reflecting the existing 
technological structure. This activities are defined on the input-output  subspace of the 
general and abstract mathematical space X. In addition to the values of inputs and 
outputs, points in this space could also represent household and other institutional income 
and expenditure accounts. We also incorporate the possibility of R&D as a separate 
productive activity. Formally, it is always possible to break R&D down into as many 
finite components as we want. The key relationship in this context is that between the 
endogenous accounts (usually, production activities and technologies, factors and 
households) and the exogenous ones.  It is this relationship that is posited to be non-linear 
and this together with some assumptions on the relevant mathematical space can lead to 
the existence of multiple equilibria. 
  Although the existence  theorems  for these multisectoral models provide 
some structure for the equilibria as sequences of fixed points in the socio-economic 
structure with evolving technology systems, it is not specified a priori which equilibrium 
will be reached. The problem of equilibrium selection thus remains open. The idea behind 
a POLIS can now be stated somewhat more formally. It is to reach a sequence of 
                                                          
4
  Both types of specifications are possible in principle.  In practice, as in the case of South 
Korea, the availability of data will often determine what type of specification will be used. 
 
5
  This could be considered  a modern mathematical representation of Schumpeter’s idea that  
perfectly competitive firms were singularly unmotivated to innovate. 
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equilibria so that in the non-linear models of the entire economy the maximal fixed points 
that are attainable are in fact reached through a combination of market forces and policy 
maneuvers over time. It is also to be  understood that path-dependence of technology 
would  rule out certain equilibria in the future. Thus initial choices of technologies can 
matter crucially at times. 
 
2. C.  The Model on a Lattice 
 Define X  as a vector lattice over a subring M  of the real field R . 
Let { }0,| ≥∈=+ xXxxx  
A non-linear mapping N  is defined such that 0,: 0 =→ ++ NXXN .  Given a vector of 
exogenous variables d , the following non-linear mapping describes a simultaneous non-
linear equations model of an economy, :E  
dNxx +=           
 (1) 
for a given +∈ Xd . 
This non-linear system represents a socio-economic system of the type described 
previously.  In order to specify the model further, the following assumptions are 
necessary.  
1. X  is order complete 
2. N  is an isotone mapping 
3.   ∈∃xˆ  such that dxNx +≥ ˆˆ  
In terms of the economics of the model, the non-linear mapping from the space of inputs 
to the space of the outputs allows for non-constant returns to scale and technical progress 
over time. The 3 assumptions are minimally necessary for the existence of an equilibrium. 
Assumption 3, in particular ensures that there is some level of output vector which can be 
produced given the technical production conditions and demand structure. 
 
Existence of Multiple Equilibria:  
Theorem: Under the assumptions 1 - 3, there exists +∈ Xx*  so that 
*x  is a solution of  
dNxx +=  
 Proof: Consider the interval [ ] { }xxXxxx ≤≤∈= + ˆ0,ˆ|ˆ,0  where xˆ  is defined as in 
assumption 3.  Take a mapping F . 
dNxXxF +→∈ +:  
F  is isotone and maps [ ]x,0  into itself. 
Define a set [ ]{ }FxxxxxD ≥∈≡ ,,0 . 
By assumption 3, D  is non-empty. 
We now show Dx inf* ≡  is a solution to dNxx += . Dx inf* ≡ ; therefore 
Dxxx ∈∀≤ ,* . F  is isotone; therefore xFxFx ≤≤*  for each Dx ∈  implying. 
 
** xFx ≤  
From (2) we have ( ) ** FxFxF ≤ . Thus DFx ∈* ; hence ** inf FxDx ≤≡  so, 
*** FxxFx ≤≤ . Therefore ** Fxx = . 
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This is an application of Tarski’s and Birkhoff’s theorem.  The key feature to note here is 
that the equilibrium is not necessarily unique.  It should also be noted that under 
additional assumptions on space X  and the mapping N  the computation of a fixed point 
can be done by standard methods (e.g. Ortega and Rheinboldt). 
 
2.D. Multiple Equilibria on Banach Space:   
 In this section the results for multiple equilibria are extended to functionals on 
Banach Space. We can define the model again for monotone iterations, this time on a 
non-empty subset of an ordered Banach space X . The mapping XXf →:  is called 
compact if it is continuous and if ( )xf  is relatively compact.  The map f  is called 
completely continuous if f  is continuous and maps bounded subsets of X  into 
compact sets.  Let X  be a non-empty subset of some ordered set Y .  A fixed point x  
of a map XXN →: is called minimal (maximal) if every fixed point y  of N  in X  
satisfies 
 
( )xyyx ≤≤  
Theorem: Let ( )PE, be an ordered Banach space and let D  be a subset of E .   
Suppose that EDf →:  is an increasing map which is compact on every order interval 
in D . If there exist ,y  Dy ∈ˆ with yy ˆ≤  such that ( )yfy ≤ and ( ) yyf ˆˆ ≤ , then f  has 
a minimal fixed point x .  Moreover, yx ≤  and ( )yFx klim= . That is, the minimal fixed 
point can be computed iteratively by means of the iteration scheme 
 yx =0  
 
( )kk xfx =+1   ,....2,1,0=k  
Moreover, the sequence ( )kx  is increasing. 
Proof: Since f  is increasing, the hypotheses imply that f  maps the order interval [ ]yy,  
into itself.  Consequently, the sequence ( )kx  is well-defined and, since it is contained in 
[ ]yyf , , it is relatively compact.  Hence it has at least one limit point.  By induction, it is 
easily seen that the sequence ( )kx  is increasing.  This implies that it has exactly one limit 
point x  and that the whole sequence converges to x . Since ƒ is continuous, x  is a fixed 
point of f .  If x  is an arbitrary fixed point in D  such that yx ≥ , then, by replacing y  
by x  in the above argument, it follows that xx ≤ . Hence x  is the minimal fixed point of 
f  in ( ) DPy ∩+ .  It should be observed that we do not claim that there exists a minimal 
fixed point of f  in D . 
We can also show that if dNxXxF +→∈ +:  is an intersecting compact map in 
a non-empty order interval  [ ]xx ˆ,  and Fxx ≤  and xxF ˆˆ ≤  then F  has a minimal fixed 
point *x  and a maximal fixed point **x .  Moreover, ( )xFx klim* =  and ( )xFx k ˆlim** = . 
The first of the above sequences is increasing and the second is decreasing.6 
 
2.E. Translating the Non-linear Model 
  
                                                          
6
  See Amann (1976) for a ‘constructive’ proof. 
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  These models, interpreted with due caution, demonstrate the theoretical 
possibility for a (Schumpeterian) positive feedback loop innovation system. However, it is 
far from transparent how such a system can be represented in actuality.  In the next section, 
an attempt will be made to first define precisely what technological systems are from an 
empirical standpoint for a specific NIE such as South Korea or Taiwan. Based on this, an 
operational way of capturing such systems empirically will be presented. The vehicle 
chosen for such a representation is the Social Accounting Matrix or SAM.  SAMs are 
elaborate quantitative constructions based on social and economic data that can show the 
economy at a point in time with the necessary detail.  How do we depict different 
technology systems in a SAM?  How can we show the evolution of a technology system in 
such a construction?  How do we incorporate R&D and other factors of significance in 
understanding innovation in a SAM?  These are some of the questions we need to raise.  At 
the end, through a series of approximations the non-linearities and complexities of an 
innovation system can be approached meaningfully by using empirical SAMs for particular 
countries.7 
 
                                                          
7
  Khan (1997c, and 1998, forthcoming) offer a technical description of the exact empirical 
methods and computational details. 
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3. Korea: The Making of a POLIS? An Economic History and Modeling based 
on Social Accounting Matrices 
 
 
  The purpose of this section is to answer the question: has Korea succeeded 
in constructing a positive feedback loop innovation system? After the theoretical 
discussion in the previous section the importance of this question is obvious.  However, 
strategies for finding the answer are less transparent. 
 
 The discussion in the previous section calls for disaggregated analysis; but it is not 
clear a priori what the appropriate level of disaggregation should be.  Both microlevel 
evidence and macroeconomic connections need to be taken into account.  Data limitations 
also inhibit detailed inquiry.  Keeping this in mind, we will nevertheless try to explore 
both microeconomic factors at the firm level and connections among different sectors. 
Needless to say, research and development will be an important area of investigation. 
 
3. A.  The Development of Modern Technology in Korea 
 
  Whatever the record in the 1960s and 1970s, by the 1980s Korea did enter a 
largely modern technology-centered era (Amsden, 1989; Khan, 1997a; Pack, 1987, 1992, 
1994; Pack and Page, 1994a, 1994b; Pack and Westphal 1986; Westphal, 1990).  Therefore, 
we need to investigate the situation during the last decade and a half in order to see the 
source and role of this modern technology system.  First, it is necessary to look at the 
transfer of technology from abroad to Korea.  In the process we also will have an 
opportunity to examine Teitel's characterization of the three phases of technological 
development.  According to Teitel (1984 a, b) the first phase is the acquisition of technology 
from abroad; the second phase involves the modification of borrowed technology.  The final 
phase is the generation of technology at home.  This acquisition-modification-creation 
process can be observed in the history of economic evolution of the advanced industrial 
countries. 
 
  The government of Korea passed the Technology Development Promotion 
Act (TDPA) in 1972 the purpose of which was to facilitate technology imports.  This 
coincided with the establishment of Technology Imports Counseling Center at the Korea 
Institute of Science and Technology.  At the same time the Korea Development Bank's 
'technology development fund' originated as a source of financing.  The following year the 
TDPA was further liberalized to relax the approval criteria for imported technologies. 
 
  The third and fourth five-year economic development plans emphasized the 
role of heavy and chemical industries.  A form of industrial policy can be seen to be at work 
here.  Table 1 summarizes the changes in Technology import policy since 1978.  The 
financial assistance facilities also played important roles. These are presented in table 2. 
Table 3 shows the declared industrialization and technology strategies during the decade of 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s.  It is important to note that promotion of high-tech industries 
became a goal only in the 1980s.   
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Table 1: Changes in Technology Import Policy since 1978 
Period Contents Industry 
First Step 
(April 1978) 
- Automatic approval items: 
• advance payment less than $30,000, 
royalty rates less than 3%,license 
period less than 3 years 
• Total royalty less than $100,000 
Machinery, shipbuilding, 
electrical goods, electronics, 
fabricated metal products, 
chemicals, textiles. 
Second Step 
(April 1979) 
- Automatic approval items: 
• Advance payment less than $50,000, 
royalty rate less than 10%, license 
period less than 10 years 
All industries, except nuclear 
energy and defense industry. 
Third Step 
(July 1980) 
- Automatic approval items: 
royalty rate less 10%, license period less 
than 10 years 
All industries. 
Fourth Step 
(September 1982) 
- Delegation of approval authority to the 
competent ministry 
All industries. 
Fifth Step 
(July 1984) 
- Transition from the approval system to a 
reporting system 
All industries. 
Sixth Step 
(July 1986) 
- Transfer of trademarks only permitted All industries. 
Seventh Step 
(July 1988) 
- Delegation of approval authority to Class 
A foreign exchange banks under the 
Foreign Exchange Control Act, except in 
cases where the license period exceeds 3 
years and the total royalty exceeds 
$100,000 or the royalty rate exceeds 2% (or 
initial payment exceeds $50,000) 
All industries. 
 
Source: Korea Industrial Technology Association, Surveys on Technology Imports, 1992, 
p.9. 
 
 
  As Table 1 shows changes in technology import policy since 1978 have 
become more liberal.  The openness that existed with respect to trade in consumer goods 
can be said to have been extended to capital goods with embodied technology. Table 2 
shows the general structure of the financial assistance system. Clearly, without such 
financing, technology imports would be hampered. These policies are consistent with the 
general development strategies by stages of development as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 2: Financial Assistance System 
Government Subsidy Direct subsidy to private firms or industrial technology research 
association who participate in special R&D project or industrial 
basic technology development project for 40-80% of R&D fund. 
Loan by Policy Fund Annual 5.0-10.5% interest rate loan on R&D and 
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commercialization of new technology. 
General Loan Loan assistance to R&D and commercialization of new 
technology by Korea Development Bank, Small-Medium Firm 
Bank, and other banks.  The same interest rates as bank loans. 
Assistance to Venture 
Capital 
Korea General Technology Fund (Inc.) 
Technology Credit 
Guarantee 
Technology Credit Guarantee Fund 
 
Source: KIET, Program for Technology Banking System Improvement, 1992. 
 
 
Table 3: Development strategies by stages of development 
Period 
  Direction of Industrialization Technological development strategy 
1960s 1. Establishment of the foundation for 
industrialization. 
2. Fostering of import-substitution 
industries. 
3. Expansion of export-oriented light 
industries (mainly labor-intensive 
industries). 
1.  Expanding education in science and 
technology and training in skills. 
2.  Establishment of the legal and 
institutional basis for the promotion of 
science and technology. 
3.  Facilitating the importation of 
advanced technologies. 
1970s 4. Enhancing the sophistication of 
industries and fostering the heavy and 
chemical industries. 
5. Promotion of small- and medium- 
sized industries. 
6. Strengthening the competitiveness of 
industries in the international market. 
1. Upgrading technological and scientific 
training in priority areas. 
2. Facilitating the adaptation and 
improvement of imported technologies 
through the establishment of research 
entities in private industries. 
3. Strengthening industrial technology 
research and development capability. 
1980s 7. Enhancing the quality of export 
goods. 
8. Promotion of skill-intensive industries 
(high-tech industries). 
9. Fostering of information industry 
1.  Providing the large-scale recruitment 
from abroad and training of highly 
qualified scientific and technological 
manpower. 
2.  Liberalization of technology imports. 
3.  Preparation for an information-oriented 
society. 
 
Source: Excerpted from Khan (1997a). 
 
  It is interesting to note that as the Korean economy has grown it has 
progressively imported more technology.  More than 75 percent of all foreign technologies 
imported between 1962 and 1991 came from Japan and the U.S.  Table 4 shows TI 
(technology imports), FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) and capital goods imports by Korea.  
The growth in imported technology and capital goods is noticeable throughout the 1980s. 
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Table 4: TI, FDI, and Capital Goods Imports: 1962-91 
year TI payment 
(A, 
$million) 
TI 
case 
FDI•      FDI•      A/B 
(B,       case     (%) 
$ million) 
Capital 
Goods 
Imports (C, 
$million) 
C/total 
imports 
(%) 
62-66    0.8   33   47.4      39      1.7    486.0 18.9 
67-71   20.4  285  218.6     350      9.3   2668.0 30.8 
72-76   96.5  434  879.4     851     11.0   8106.0 27.3 
   77   58.1  168   83.6      54     69.5   3008.1 27.8 
   78   85.1  297  149.4      51     57.0   5080.3 33.9 
   79   93.9  291  191.3      55     49.1   6314.0 31.0 
   80  107.2  222  143.1      40     74.9   5125.0 23.0 
   81  107.1  247  153.1      44     70.0   6158.2 23.6 
   82  115.7  308  189.0      56     61.2   6232.7 25.7 
   83  149.5  362  269.4      75     55.5   7814.7 29.8 
   84  213.2  437  422.3     104     50.5  10106.3 33.0 
   85  295.5  454  532.1     127     55.4  11078.9 35.6 
   86  411.0  517  354.7     203    115.9  11340.2 35.9 
   87  523.7  637 1063.3     362     49.3  14552.4 35.5 
   88  676.3  751 1282.7     342     52.7  19033.4 36.7 
   89  888.6  763 1090.2     336     81.5  22370.3 36.4 
   90 1087.0  738  802.5     296    135.5  25451.3 36.4 
   91 1183.8  592 1396.0     287     84.8  30092.0 36.9 
 
total 
 
6109.3 
 
7526 
 
9268.8    3672     65.9 
 
195016.0 
 
33.3 
ratio (%) (3.1)  (4.8) (100)  
• approval basis. 
Sources: Korea Industrial Technology Association, Major Indicators of Industrial 
Technology, 1992; Ministry of Finance, The Status of Foreign Direct Investment, Dec. 
1991; The Korean Statistical Association, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1992. 
 
  The adoption and diffusion of technology (imported or otherwise acquired), 
will inevitably require various lengths of time. On the demand side, the profitability of 
imported technology must be a  major factor.  However direct measures are impossible to 
get. A proxy (Khan 1997a) is obtained by considering the profitability of the large and 
medium sized enterprises which are assumed to use imported technology.  Adaptabilities of 
technologies also matter. The extent to which imported technologies can be adapted to 
domestic needs and circumstances also depends mainly on the technological capabilities of 
the host firms.  Here, too, the large- and medium- sized enterprises will generally have a 
better chance of adapting the foreign technology. 
 
  It is possible to construct the relevant information a SAM with Technology 
Systems (SAM-TECH) format.  Looking at the information organized as a SAM-TECH as 
well as closely within its components results in the following observations: 
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1. With the exception of heavy industries, large and medium firms import relatively new 
technologies.  This is consistent with Khan’s (1997a) finding that the production functions 
in different firm sizes within the same industry differ. 
  
2. Large size firms also seem to have greater bargaining power.  They have shorter waiting 
periods for adoption of foreign technology. 
 
3. Industries with competitive structures import technology at a slower rate than those 
which are oligopolistic. 
 
4. In its acquisition, the price of new technology seems less of a determinant than the 
perceived needs of the firm.  In other words demand for technology imports has been 
inelastic in many cases. 
 
  Given the prevalence of foreign technology in a number of sectors, one 
should expect more productivity increase in these sectors than in the other sectors with less 
than state-of-the-art technology.  On the whole, this does turn out to be the case.  However, 
the average for the foreign technology-intensive sectors turns out to be 2.8 percent TFP 
growth annually from 1980 to 1994. 
 
  If imported technology were the only source of technology for the modern 
technology system, then the question of whether Korea has a POLIS could be settled 
immediately.  The short answer would be that indeed it has no POLIS.  However, the 
policies of the Korean government and the efforts of large Korean firms to create a national 
innovation system cannot be passed over in silence. 
 
3.B. Learning to Innovate: The Korean National Innovation System 
  
  Larry Westphal and Howard Pack among others, have emphasized the role 
of industrial policy in an export-led economy like South Korea.  According to Westphal 
(1990): 
Korea provides an illuminating case of state intervention to promote 
economic development.  Like many other third world governments, Korea's 
government has selectively intervened to affect the allocation of resources 
among industrial activities.  It has also used similar policies: taxes and 
subsidies, credit rationing, various kinds of licensing, and the creation of 
public enterprises...but these policies have been applied in the context of a 
radically different development strategy, one of export-led industrialization.8 
 
 
  If one follows a Schumpeterian approach to technology creation as a cascade 
of interlinked systemic activities, the possibilities for economies of scale and scope leading 
                                                          
8
  Larry Westphal (1990), 'Industrial Policy in an Export-Propelled Economy: Lessons from 
South Korea's Experience', The Journal of Economic Perspectives (summer), 41. 
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to the establishment of a POLIS arise out of the conjunction of a market system open to the 
world economy and selective interventions.  Promotion of targeted infant industries has 
been part of this strategy of selective interventions in Korea.  Examples include cement, 
fertilizer and petroleum refining in the 1960s.  These were followed by steel and 
petrochemicals.  In the late 1970s, shipbuilding, other chemicals, capital goods and durable 
consumer goods appeared on the list.  More recently, electronic and information 
technologies are being promoted.  Do these industries innovate?  Even if they individually 
do innovate, do the industrial, governmental and social institutions connected to the 
innovation process add up to an innovation system?  Furthermore is the innovation system, 
if it exists, characterized by positive feedbacks? 
 
  One quantitative indicator of the possibility of an innovation system would 
be the trend in R&D.  Table 5 shows the major R&D indicators in Korea. Between 1965 
and 1990 the expenditures increased more than 500 times.  However the major take off has 
really been since the mid-1980s.  Noticeable also is the reversal of the roles of public and 
private sectors.  In 1990 the private sector provided 84 percent of R&D funds. 
 
  The number of research personnel is also an important indicator of the 
possibilities of a national innovation system.  In the case of Korea, the number of core 
scientists increased by more than 30 times between 1965 and 1990.  Here again, companies 
and universities are now the first and second largest employers of researchers, respectively. 
Table 5: Major R&D Indicators in Korea 
 
                                                         1965              1975             1980              1985              1990 
R&D expenditure ($ Million)                   8                 88                321              1298             4481 
  Funds from government (A)             7.2                  59                186                247               717 
  Funds from private sources (B)        0.8                  29                135               1051            3764 
  A:B                                                90:10            67:33              52:48             19:81            16:84 
  R&D/Manufacturing sales (%)          n.a.              0.35               0.65                1.51              2.07 
GNP ($Million)                                  2759           20,952           55,345            87,703       234,607 
  R&D/GNP (%)                                0.29               0.42               0.58                1.48              1.91 
R&D researchers (persons )             2765           10,275           18,434            41,473          70,503 
  Research institutes                           n.a.              5308              4598               7154          10,434 
  Universities                                       n.a.              2312              8695            14,935          21,332 
  Companies                                        n.a.              2655              5141            18,996          38,737 
R&D researchers per 10,000 pop.      1.0                 2.9                 4.8                 10.1             16.4 
Source: Ministry of Science and Technology, Report on the Survey of Research and 
Development in Science and Technology, various issues; Linsu Kim (1993), op. cit., p. 370. 
 
  Another important indicator of an innovation system is the number of 
patents.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s the number of Korean patents grew, on the 
average, at a rate of 17.1 percent (see table 6).  In absolute terms, however, Korea seems to 
be still far behind the advanced industrial nations. 
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Table 6: Trends of Industrial Property Rights Applied by Korean and Foreign 
Nationals 
         (Unit: case, %) 
   1986   1989   1990   1991 Average Growth 
Rate (1986-91) 
Patents 
Utility Models 
Industrial         
Designs 
Trade Marks 
  12,759 
  22,401 
  18,731 
   
  28,031 
  23,315 
  21,530 
  18,196 
   
  39,832 
  25,820 
  22,654 
  18,769 
   
  46,826 
  28,132 
  25,895 
  20,097 
 
  46,612 
     17.1 
      2.9 
      1.4 
    
     10.7 
     TOTAL   81,922  102,873  114,069  120,736       8.1 
Korean Nat’ls 
Foreign Nat’ls 
  63,256 
  18,666 
  68,300 
  27,271 
  81,713 
  32,356 
  90,659 
  30,077 
      7.5 
     10.0 
Source: The Office of Patents Administration, Patents Annals, various issues. 
  One special feature of the Korean industrial system in general and its 
innovation system in particular, is the role played by its chaebols, the big business 
conglomerates in developing and improving industrial technologies. With a large 
endowment of capital and modern complex organizational structure the chaebol can recruit 
the best human resources, identify and purchase the best foreign technology and obtain 
preferential financing.  Since many observers are offering extremely pessimistic prognosis 
of their current debacle it needs to be pointed out that a few chaebols have also established 
R&D and technical training facilities recognizing the importance of in-house R&D 
capability. 
 
  At the microeconomic level R&D capacity building by a firm can be 
illustrated by discussing the example of Samsung Electronics Company (SEC).  SEC is 
Korea's largest integrated electronics company.  Table 7 shows the diverse product lines of 
SEC. 
Table 7: Major Product Line-up of SEC 
 
      Business Sector                  Product Line 
Audio and Video Business TV, LCD Projector, VCR, Camcorder, Component 
Audio, CDP, MD, DCC, LDP, MOD, CD-I, CD-ROM 
Consumer Electronics Business Refrigerator, Microwave Oven, Air Conditioner, 
Washing Machine, Vacuum Cleaner 
Computer System Business Mini Computer, Micro Computer, Desk-Top PC, Lap-
Top/Note PC, Pen Base PC, Palm-Top PC, Network 
System, Work Station, Optical Filing System, 
Teleconference System, CTS, BAS 
Telecommunication System Business TDX, Modem, MUX, PAD, Facsimile, Typewriter, 
Copier, Key Phone, Pager, Car Phone, Hand-held Phone, 
Optical Communication System, Optical Fiber 
Memory Devices Business DRAM, SRAM, EEPROM, MASK ROM, Specialty 
Memory, TPH, TFT, LCD, CIS 
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Micro Devices Business Discrete, MOSIC, Linear IC, ASIC, Logic IC, Micro 
Component, DSP 
Source: Public Relations Office, Samsung Electronics, Creativity and Innovation (1993), p. 47. 
 
 
  In the semi-conductor field, Samsung developed 64K DRAMs in 1983.  In 
1990 it shared in the making of 16M DRAM.  SEC also exports an electronic switching 
system (Time Division Exchange or TDX) to other LDCs.  It also manufactures digital, 
cellular and satellite transmission systems.  It is also active in fiber-optic communication 
systems.  SEC offers a full line of products in the micro-computer field.  Perhaps better 
known among consumers is the line of consumer electronics products of SEC ranging from 
TV to microwave ovens. 
 
Table 8: SEC’s Three-tiered R&D System 
 
 Samsung Electronic Company Samsung Advanced 
 Institute of technology 
 Integrated Research 
Centers 
Research Team and 
Design Office attached 
to Business Sector 
 
ROLE 
 
Establishment of 
technological 
foundation for growth 
of company 
 
Strengthening of 
Cooperation with SAIT 
Maximization of 
company’s profit 
Establishment of technological 
foundation for the growth of 
the Group 
 
Technical supports to affiliate 
companies 
RESEARC
H AREA 
New products 
development and 
commercialization on a  
short- and mid-term 
basis 
Commercialization of 
new products on a 
short-term basis 
 
Diversification of 
models, improvement of 
functions and cost 
reduction of existing 
products 
Development of new products 
on a mid- and long-term basis 
 
Development of core 
technologies, bottle-neck 
technologies, and new 
materials and parts 
Source: Twenty Years History of SEC, 837. 
 
 
  SEC has a three tiered R&D system shown in table 8. Samsung Advanced 
Institute of Technology (SAIT) carries out research into basic or core technologies.  
Application technology and mid-term projects are the responsibility of the research centers 
associated with SEC's four business sectors.  Finally, on the production technology side 
research teams attached to each division unit work closely with production and marketing 
people to make new or improved products. 
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  The discussion so far shows the strengths and limitations of both the 
standard macro and micro approaches in addressing the question posed at the beginning of 
this section.  At the macro level, statistical results may overstate or understate the overall 
innovative capability.  At the same time the results on the whole warn against a casual 
optimism regarding East Asian growth in general and Korea in particular.  The micro 
considerations show that in contrast to macro-pessimism some companies such as SEC do 
have considerable innovative capabilities.  However, it is not obvious if the SEC experience 
is generalizable for Korea as a whole or even a few sectors.  For this we need a 
multisectoral approach. 
 
3.C.  Modern Technology System in a SAM for Korea 
 
  The starting point for identifying the modern technology system in Korea in 
the late 1980s were the two earlier SAM-TECHs built by Thorbecke (1980)9 and Khan 
(1985, 1997a).  The accounts in the earlier SAM are given in the following table (sectors 1 
to 77): 
 
                                                          
9
  The SAM-TECH built by Thorbecke can be found in Svejnar-Thorbecke (1980, 1982). 
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Table 9: Endogenous Accounts in the SAM-TECH for South Korea, 1988 
 
  1      Engineers 
  2      Technicians 
  3      Skilled workers 
  4      Apprentices 
  5      Unskilled 
  6      White collar 
  7      Self-employed (manufacturing) 
  8      Self-employed in service 
  9      Capital 
 10      Agricultural workers 
 11      Workers in farm size 1 
 12      Workers in farm size 2 
 13      Workers in farm size 3 
 14      Workers in farm size 4 
 15      Government workers 
 16-30      same as 1-15 except that they now refer  to households as opposed to 
factors 
 31      Cereals 
 32      Other agriculture 
 33      Fishing 
 34      Processed food (M) 
 35      Processed food (T) 
 36      Mining 
 37      Cotton yarn (M) 
 38      Cotton yarn (T) 
 39      Woolen and worsted yarn       (M) 
 40      Woollen and worsted yarn       (T) 
 41      Other (M) 
 42      Other (T) 
 43      Cotton fabric (M) 
 44      Cotton fabric (T) 
 45 Woollen and worsted fabric      (M) 
 46 Woollen and worsted fabric      (T) 
 47      Others 
 48     Finished textile products 
 49      Lumber and furniture 
 50      Chemical products (M) 
 51      Chemical products (T) 
 52      Charcoal and wood 
 53      Crude Oil 
 54      Coal (M) 
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 55      Coal (T) 
 56      Briquettes 
 57      Dried coal 
 58      Fuel oils 
 59      Gasoline 
 60      Carbide 
 61      Electricity 
 62      Gas services 
 63 Cement, non-metallic mineral products 
 64      Metal products (M) 
 65      Metal products (T) 
 66      Machinery 
 67      Transport equipment 
 68  Beverages and tobacco (M) 
 69  Beverages and tobacco (T) 
 70      Other consumer products 
 71      Construction 
 72      Real Estate 
 73 Transportation and communication 
 74      Trade and banking (M) 
 75      Trade and banking (T) 
 76      Education 
 77 Medical, personal and other services 
 78      Research and Development 
Note: M= Modern, T = Traditional 
  As the reader must have noticed, in the above table, the modern SAM-
TECH (ModSAM-TECH) is constructed by adding R&D rows and columns.  Thus a 78 X 
78 endogenous account SAM is formed. The focus is on identifying productivity and value 
added changes; but some attention also needs to be paid to the distributional characteristics 
of the innovation system. 
 
  Furthermore, in line with a strategy outlined in Khan (1997c, 1998 
forthcoming) two successive approximations for two different scale levels are made.  One is 
for 1986 GDP and the second is for the increment in two years. In the latter case co-
efficients are changed in proportion to growth.  This is most probably a lower bound 
increasing returns assumption.  On the whole this involves a change in average propensity 
of investing in high technology sectors less than five percent. 
  The simple multiplier exercises indicate a modest POLIS effect.  For each 
one percent injection of R&D output in the ModSAM-TECH increases by 2.5 percent.  The 
modern technological system shows a range of increase varying between two percent and 
3.6 percent. 
 
  In summary, in this section I have considered the claims about the growth 
process in Korea by both the miracle-makers and the miracle-breakers. A detailed 
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investigation at the sectoral and micro level raises the possibility of a POLIS in Korea's 
modern technology system. An approximate and crude empirical implementation of the 
formal model of POLIS via a SAM-TECH for Korea confirms this modest expectation. 
However, Korea now faces the challenge of innovating in an increasingly competitive 
global environment.  Also, the rewards from innovation, even if the Korean POLIS 
becomes a reality, would seem to be unevenly distributed.10 
 
  In retrospect, the ability of a small, open economy to build an innovation 
system may be seen to depend crucially on the strategic complementarity between R&D 
promoting activities and human capital deepening processes. While the human capital 
aspects of Korean development have been explored extensively, the understanding of the 
R&D process and its complementary relation with human capital remains incomplete.  
The results of this section, however tentative, can provide further motivation for such 
studies for Korea and other countries. 
                                                          
10
  The Schumpeterian creative destruction leads to rents for successful firms; but the 
distribution of the rents depend on the existing social compact between labor and capital. 
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Conclusion 
  The paper has presented a somewhat novel theory of innovation based on 
the idea of, Managed Creative Destruction(MCD). This theory acknowledges the role of 
both the state policies and market processes. It should be emphasized that neither 
institution can guarantee sustained innovation processes. Paraphrasing Jefferson, we 
could say that the price of innovation is eternal vigilance. This vigilance combined with 
ingenuity on the parts of both state and market actors is a necessary condition for a 
sustained econmy wide innovation sytem. 
                         The theory of  Managed Creative Destruction(MCD) was used in this 
paper to build a multisectoral model of innovation. It was also emphasized that the roots 
of Managed Creative Destruction(MCD) are in Schumpeter’s idea of technical progress 
as creative destruction in a market system. In our approach economic growth is the 
outcome of both technological progress and changes in aggregate demand over time. 
Therefore, it can be said that it combines the Keynesian idea of effective demand with 
Schumpeterian creative destruction. One can also locate the model more generally within 
what Richard Goodwin has called the MKS (Marx-Keynes-Schumpeter) class of models. 
The political economy approach of state-market interaction followed here makes it 
somewhat distinct from the classical approaches. 
 
  The model proceeds at the multisectoral macro level but is consistent with 
microfoundations such as the one given by Aghion and Howitt (1992). It goes somewhat 
further than some of the existing models by considering both physical and human capital 
as well as the interaction between the two. As expected, R&D plays a crucial role, but 
without complementary human capital, the positive feedback loop innovation structure 
(POLIS) can not be built. 
 
  The model could be extended theoretically by making technical progress 
bounded so that return to innovations could eventually fall. Also, the relationship between 
technical change and business cycle could be explored further. The illustrative example of 
Korea indicates the usefulness of the POLIS approach. Future empirical work could 
explore the role of POLIS in  developing as well as developed countries. 
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